Thursday, May 29, 2003
Plus ca change...
Matthew Yglesias thinks that the Democrats need to get themselves some religion. He writes:
I find this particularly interesting since I wrote my B.A. on the development of absolutism in sixteenth century France, and one of the things I concluded was that the monarchy used piety as a means to convince the populace that it would limit its own exercise of power. On the one hand this makes a certain kind of intuitive sense. If it is very important to you that a politician always be honest, would you prefer a politician who believed that lying was usually of negative net utility, or one that believed his soul would rot in hell for all eternity were he to tell a lie? The problem with this sort of test, though, is that it makes it very difficult to catch the really big liars--the ones who are willing to lie not only about political matters, but also their beliefs as to the potential consequeses in the afterlife for lying. Much better to set up institutional checks that will ensure that lying really will be of negative net utility, and elect politicians that seem intelligent enough to recognize this fact. Sure this won't stop some liars from trying to beat the system, but it certainly is much better than one that only disadvantages ethical athiests.
There are thus two reasons why democrats would not want to buy into a system in which religious professions served as a proxy basis for judging the ethics of a candidate. The first is that, as the French people discovered, politicians are perfectly capable of making sincere protestations of piety at the same time as they trample your rights in the dust, making this an inherently bad proxy system. The second is that a test that provides the greatest disadvantage to ethical athiests will also provide more disadvantage to the Democrats that are more likely to be athiests than Republicans who are more likely to be Christians.
Matthew Yglesias thinks that the Democrats need to get themselves some religion. He writes:
A substantial portion of politics is about moral argument, and for most Americans morality and religion are closely tied together. This is not, in my opinion, an ideal situation, but it's the situation we've got so the Democrats might as well learn to live with it.
I find this particularly interesting since I wrote my B.A. on the development of absolutism in sixteenth century France, and one of the things I concluded was that the monarchy used piety as a means to convince the populace that it would limit its own exercise of power. On the one hand this makes a certain kind of intuitive sense. If it is very important to you that a politician always be honest, would you prefer a politician who believed that lying was usually of negative net utility, or one that believed his soul would rot in hell for all eternity were he to tell a lie? The problem with this sort of test, though, is that it makes it very difficult to catch the really big liars--the ones who are willing to lie not only about political matters, but also their beliefs as to the potential consequeses in the afterlife for lying. Much better to set up institutional checks that will ensure that lying really will be of negative net utility, and elect politicians that seem intelligent enough to recognize this fact. Sure this won't stop some liars from trying to beat the system, but it certainly is much better than one that only disadvantages ethical athiests.
There are thus two reasons why democrats would not want to buy into a system in which religious professions served as a proxy basis for judging the ethics of a candidate. The first is that, as the French people discovered, politicians are perfectly capable of making sincere protestations of piety at the same time as they trample your rights in the dust, making this an inherently bad proxy system. The second is that a test that provides the greatest disadvantage to ethical athiests will also provide more disadvantage to the Democrats that are more likely to be athiests than Republicans who are more likely to be Christians.
Wednesday, May 28, 2003
Plagiarize
Let no one else's work evade your eyes
Remember why the good Lord made your eyes
So don't shade your eyes
But plagiarize, plagiarize, plagiarize
Only be sure always to call it please research
-Nicolai Ivanovich Lobachevsky, as reported by Tom Lehrer
Daniel Drezner has an interesting, if rather disconnected, post up about plagerism. He raises three separate, but interesting issues--the use of ghostwriters and research assistants by well-known columnists, the extent to which tough restictions on plagiarism inhibit the spread of ideas, and the attitude of the blogosphere on the plagiarism question. I'll be interested to see if the response is as he predicts.
Let no one else's work evade your eyes
Remember why the good Lord made your eyes
So don't shade your eyes
But plagiarize, plagiarize, plagiarize
Only be sure always to call it please research
-Nicolai Ivanovich Lobachevsky, as reported by Tom Lehrer
Daniel Drezner has an interesting, if rather disconnected, post up about plagerism. He raises three separate, but interesting issues--the use of ghostwriters and research assistants by well-known columnists, the extent to which tough restictions on plagiarism inhibit the spread of ideas, and the attitude of the blogosphere on the plagiarism question. I'll be interested to see if the response is as he predicts.
Not the Real Slippery Slope
As you might note from my previous post, the truly bothersome slippery slope argument in the morning-after pill debate is not from abortion to morning-after pill, but from morning-after pill to the pill. How many conservatives do you see owning up to that one? And speaking as a woman, I may have a fair degree of sympathy for anti-abortion measures, but when it comes to hormone-based contraception, "from my cold, dead hands!" say I.
As you might note from my previous post, the truly bothersome slippery slope argument in the morning-after pill debate is not from abortion to morning-after pill, but from morning-after pill to the pill. How many conservatives do you see owning up to that one? And speaking as a woman, I may have a fair degree of sympathy for anti-abortion measures, but when it comes to hormone-based contraception, "from my cold, dead hands!" say I.
Tuesday, May 27, 2003
Rights for Kids
Given Will's attitude towards parents and education, I'm surprised he hasn't been all over this story about an uprising of mostly American teens at a harsh private school in Costa Rica. While I generally think that parents should have a fair degree of say in the education of their children, it disturbs me very much that parents can send children out of the country, and hence beyond the reach of American child abuse laws, if they so choose. It does seem that most of the parents were unaware of the severity of the school, but I'm not sure to what extent that should excuse them in these circumstances, or what is the best way to prevent such incidents in the future. Thoughts?
Given Will's attitude towards parents and education, I'm surprised he hasn't been all over this story about an uprising of mostly American teens at a harsh private school in Costa Rica. While I generally think that parents should have a fair degree of say in the education of their children, it disturbs me very much that parents can send children out of the country, and hence beyond the reach of American child abuse laws, if they so choose. It does seem that most of the parents were unaware of the severity of the school, but I'm not sure to what extent that should excuse them in these circumstances, or what is the best way to prevent such incidents in the future. Thoughts?
Evangelicals being Evangelical
Amanda seems upset that not everyone is as exquisitely culturally sensitive as she would like. Apparently it bothers her that groups of like-minded people are sharing advice on how to convince another group of people of the error of their ways. Now, if Evangelical Christians were proposing that Muslims be converted at the point of a gun, I too would be upset. But the methods they are proposing include conversation, hospitality, and chocolate chip cookies. What on earth is wrong with this? Isn't this exactly how we want people to go about persuading others of the potential error of their ways? Or does Amanda think there's something inherently coercive about chocolate chip cookies?
Perhaps it's the one-sided nature of these sessions that bothers her. But if a group of pro-choice activists gathered to discuss the various ways that the pro-life position could be refuted without also including a graphic description of the abortion procedure and a short presentation by an abortion survivor as to why getting an abortion was the greatest mistake of her life, would Amanda be upset? And if the presentation were to conclude with the advice that potential converts should not be taken to a pro-abortion rally, but rather invited over for dinner and discussion, would she think that made things better or worse?
Tolerance should mean exactly what is seems to mean to these Evangelicals--that all people should be treated with courtesy and respect, no matter how erroneous or detestable one finds there views. It should not mean that one is required by the PC police to shrug one's shoulders and get on with life rather than attempt to convince others of the error of their ways. What good, after all, is a marketplace of ideas if people don't visit it to hawk their wares? Be they the New York Times preaching evangelical urban liberalism, or the Southern Baptist Convention preaching evangelical Christianity, we should be pleased to see them addressing their opponents with kindness and courtesy, and displeased to see them doing so with coercion or contempt.
Amanda seems upset that not everyone is as exquisitely culturally sensitive as she would like. Apparently it bothers her that groups of like-minded people are sharing advice on how to convince another group of people of the error of their ways. Now, if Evangelical Christians were proposing that Muslims be converted at the point of a gun, I too would be upset. But the methods they are proposing include conversation, hospitality, and chocolate chip cookies. What on earth is wrong with this? Isn't this exactly how we want people to go about persuading others of the potential error of their ways? Or does Amanda think there's something inherently coercive about chocolate chip cookies?
Perhaps it's the one-sided nature of these sessions that bothers her. But if a group of pro-choice activists gathered to discuss the various ways that the pro-life position could be refuted without also including a graphic description of the abortion procedure and a short presentation by an abortion survivor as to why getting an abortion was the greatest mistake of her life, would Amanda be upset? And if the presentation were to conclude with the advice that potential converts should not be taken to a pro-abortion rally, but rather invited over for dinner and discussion, would she think that made things better or worse?
Tolerance should mean exactly what is seems to mean to these Evangelicals--that all people should be treated with courtesy and respect, no matter how erroneous or detestable one finds there views. It should not mean that one is required by the PC police to shrug one's shoulders and get on with life rather than attempt to convince others of the error of their ways. What good, after all, is a marketplace of ideas if people don't visit it to hawk their wares? Be they the New York Times preaching evangelical urban liberalism, or the Southern Baptist Convention preaching evangelical Christianity, we should be pleased to see them addressing their opponents with kindness and courtesy, and displeased to see them doing so with coercion or contempt.
Thursday, May 22, 2003
Noble Lie?
Will asks why we don't let lawyers know ahead of time which judge will be hearing their argument. The answer is, I think, that it is a principle of our justice system that it should not matter which judge hears the case--the outcome should nevertheless be the same. Obviously this is not the case. But do we want to admit, or even endorse, this fact? It seems to me that while ideological judges are currently a fact of life, they are not a particularly desirable fact. I have no idea how to do away with this current judicial malaise of which partisan squabbles over confirmation seem to be a symptom--I'm no legal scholar to be sure. Nevertheless, I can see that it would be desirable, and certainly it is desirable that we continue to hold justice as application of interpretive rules above justice as judgement as our judicial standard, and therefore that we would want it not to be important who hears what cases.
That being true, I recognize that pretending there is no problem--that who hears your case isn't important--is not the same thing as solving the problem. Nevertheless, these sorts of salutary lies can help remind people what their ideals are, even if they are failing to live up to them. Giving lawyers the ability to prepare for the biases of a particular judge might make for better justice under our current system, but it also represents a step away from the system we would most like to have.
Will asks why we don't let lawyers know ahead of time which judge will be hearing their argument. The answer is, I think, that it is a principle of our justice system that it should not matter which judge hears the case--the outcome should nevertheless be the same. Obviously this is not the case. But do we want to admit, or even endorse, this fact? It seems to me that while ideological judges are currently a fact of life, they are not a particularly desirable fact. I have no idea how to do away with this current judicial malaise of which partisan squabbles over confirmation seem to be a symptom--I'm no legal scholar to be sure. Nevertheless, I can see that it would be desirable, and certainly it is desirable that we continue to hold justice as application of interpretive rules above justice as judgement as our judicial standard, and therefore that we would want it not to be important who hears what cases.
That being true, I recognize that pretending there is no problem--that who hears your case isn't important--is not the same thing as solving the problem. Nevertheless, these sorts of salutary lies can help remind people what their ideals are, even if they are failing to live up to them. Giving lawyers the ability to prepare for the biases of a particular judge might make for better justice under our current system, but it also represents a step away from the system we would most like to have.
Plan B, take two
The Prolifeguy has graciously responded to my earlier questions. I appreciate the clarification of several of his points, but I'm still very confused on something. I pointed out that all hormonal birth control methods could work in some cases by preventing implantation, and asked if he thus supported banning them along with the morning after pill. He responds:
Given the culture in which we live, I fear OCPs are a lesser evil that we must simply accept, even given the risk of abortion they entail. Better to prevent the abortions that would occur without OCP usage, than to simply eliminate OCPs, thus increasing the number of fertilizations and implantations, and ultimately, abortions. So my answer is no. Lesser of two evils.
What I don't understand is why the lesser of two evils reasoning does not also apply to the morning after pill. Given its unplesant side effects (nausea, cramps, and disruption of the menstrual cycle) it hardly seems poised to replace other methods of birth control. And if we also accept that the group that most uses it (largely young, single women) is also the group most likely to consider abortion as a response to pregnancy, it seems therefore that unless the morning after pill always or almost always works by preventing implantation, its net effect will be to reduce the number of abortions performed--something that just about everyone would agree is a social good.
The Prolifeguy has graciously responded to my earlier questions. I appreciate the clarification of several of his points, but I'm still very confused on something. I pointed out that all hormonal birth control methods could work in some cases by preventing implantation, and asked if he thus supported banning them along with the morning after pill. He responds:
Given the culture in which we live, I fear OCPs are a lesser evil that we must simply accept, even given the risk of abortion they entail. Better to prevent the abortions that would occur without OCP usage, than to simply eliminate OCPs, thus increasing the number of fertilizations and implantations, and ultimately, abortions. So my answer is no. Lesser of two evils.
What I don't understand is why the lesser of two evils reasoning does not also apply to the morning after pill. Given its unplesant side effects (nausea, cramps, and disruption of the menstrual cycle) it hardly seems poised to replace other methods of birth control. And if we also accept that the group that most uses it (largely young, single women) is also the group most likely to consider abortion as a response to pregnancy, it seems therefore that unless the morning after pill always or almost always works by preventing implantation, its net effect will be to reduce the number of abortions performed--something that just about everyone would agree is a social good.
Tuesday, May 20, 2003
Plan B
Diotima referred readers to a prolifeguy blog post on the morning after pill. He doesn't like it because it may work by preventing implantation of the fertilized egg rather than preventing fertilization. But actually, the same thing is true, albeit to a much lesser extent, for all types of hormonal contraceptives. Does he thus propose that we should ban all of these also? Furthermore, certain tests, such as amniocentesis carried out during pregnancy increase the chance of a miscarriage. Should we ban these as well?
However, my main bone of contention is with this claim:
Any embryologist worth his or her salt would call Plan B "post-conception contraception," aka abortion. Be pro-choice if you want, but for G-d's sake, pick up a science textbook and see how they define life...For anyone unfamiliar with basic human embryology, a fertilized egg is a unique, growing, living member of our species. Just like you, just like me, just like Gloria Feldt (although her humanity remains somewhat in doubt), only at our most vulnerable moment.
Now, it's been a while since I picked up a science textbook, but I seem to remember that the definition of life involved demonstrating that the substance in question grew, took in nutrients, maintained homeostasis, responded to stumuli, and reproduced. So yes, a fertilized egg (which does all of these things) is obviously alive. But so are the cells that line your cheeks, so that according to science, whenever you perform the basic high school biology experiment of taking a scraping of cheek cells, staining them, and looking at the nuclei under a microscope you kill human life. Is this really what he means to say?
It's not that I think defining life at conception is obviously wrong, as I've said before. Rather, it is that there is nothing in the biological definition of life that mandates a certain response to what is ultimately a moral and philosophical question.
Diotima referred readers to a prolifeguy blog post on the morning after pill. He doesn't like it because it may work by preventing implantation of the fertilized egg rather than preventing fertilization. But actually, the same thing is true, albeit to a much lesser extent, for all types of hormonal contraceptives. Does he thus propose that we should ban all of these also? Furthermore, certain tests, such as amniocentesis carried out during pregnancy increase the chance of a miscarriage. Should we ban these as well?
However, my main bone of contention is with this claim:
Any embryologist worth his or her salt would call Plan B "post-conception contraception," aka abortion. Be pro-choice if you want, but for G-d's sake, pick up a science textbook and see how they define life...For anyone unfamiliar with basic human embryology, a fertilized egg is a unique, growing, living member of our species. Just like you, just like me, just like Gloria Feldt (although her humanity remains somewhat in doubt), only at our most vulnerable moment.
Now, it's been a while since I picked up a science textbook, but I seem to remember that the definition of life involved demonstrating that the substance in question grew, took in nutrients, maintained homeostasis, responded to stumuli, and reproduced. So yes, a fertilized egg (which does all of these things) is obviously alive. But so are the cells that line your cheeks, so that according to science, whenever you perform the basic high school biology experiment of taking a scraping of cheek cells, staining them, and looking at the nuclei under a microscope you kill human life. Is this really what he means to say?
It's not that I think defining life at conception is obviously wrong, as I've said before. Rather, it is that there is nothing in the biological definition of life that mandates a certain response to what is ultimately a moral and philosophical question.
Brilliant Idea
Much as I like Steven Landsburg's article over at Slate about incentives for juries to get their verdicts right, he's missed the American group that is most in need of incentives--voters. That's right. Besides fining jurors who get it wrong, we should fine voters who get it wrong.
As the recent spate of scandals has shown, as well as the recent spate of terrible legislation, our representatives as a whole are a pretty undistinguished bunch. Yet voters seem content, year in and year out, to keep electing the same tired batch of nobodies. It's not that our voters intend to ruin government. It's only that weighing candidates is a difficult job. It too requires much attention and energy. Letting the same old same old coast to victory in the primaries is much simpler than determining whether the new crop of candidates has actual promise. If we wish voters to perform this task successfully we need a better system of incentives. When states elect a John McCain or a Daniel Patrick Moynihan, send them a big fat reward. When they elect a Trent Lott or a Rick Santorum, hit them with a big fat fine. And so as not to discourage them from voting, pay them for doing that also.
Consider the benefits. Currently, our voters are an apathetic, careless bunch. Even should they decide to vote, they seldom take the trouble to inform themselves of the issues, they allow themselves to be influenced by transparent political propoganda, and they don't even take the time to determine accurately which box on their punch card corresponds to which candidate. Would they still behave this carelessly if they knew next year's tax refund was on the line?
With an independent review board composed of government bureaucrats and connected academics in place to tell voter when they've gotten it wrong, there would be a lot fewer Congressional embarassments running around Washington. Sure the occasional charming liar will still slip through the system. But by hitting voters where it matters most--in their pocketbooks--when they elect bad officials, we'll get better legistators on average.
Much as I like Steven Landsburg's article over at Slate about incentives for juries to get their verdicts right, he's missed the American group that is most in need of incentives--voters. That's right. Besides fining jurors who get it wrong, we should fine voters who get it wrong.
As the recent spate of scandals has shown, as well as the recent spate of terrible legislation, our representatives as a whole are a pretty undistinguished bunch. Yet voters seem content, year in and year out, to keep electing the same tired batch of nobodies. It's not that our voters intend to ruin government. It's only that weighing candidates is a difficult job. It too requires much attention and energy. Letting the same old same old coast to victory in the primaries is much simpler than determining whether the new crop of candidates has actual promise. If we wish voters to perform this task successfully we need a better system of incentives. When states elect a John McCain or a Daniel Patrick Moynihan, send them a big fat reward. When they elect a Trent Lott or a Rick Santorum, hit them with a big fat fine. And so as not to discourage them from voting, pay them for doing that also.
Consider the benefits. Currently, our voters are an apathetic, careless bunch. Even should they decide to vote, they seldom take the trouble to inform themselves of the issues, they allow themselves to be influenced by transparent political propoganda, and they don't even take the time to determine accurately which box on their punch card corresponds to which candidate. Would they still behave this carelessly if they knew next year's tax refund was on the line?
With an independent review board composed of government bureaucrats and connected academics in place to tell voter when they've gotten it wrong, there would be a lot fewer Congressional embarassments running around Washington. Sure the occasional charming liar will still slip through the system. But by hitting voters where it matters most--in their pocketbooks--when they elect bad officials, we'll get better legistators on average.
Wednesday, May 14, 2003
Schools
Having read Will's monster post on schools, I do not disagree with him. In fact, I would be pleased to see what he suggests become national policy. I just don't think it will solve the problem of inner-city, poor students largely attending, through apathy, convenience, or lack of access to truly good options, substandard schools.
Also, I notice that not once in his lengthy discourse does Will mention parents, people generally considered to play a crucial role in the succss of a child's education. I would be curious indeed to know what role Will envisions for them.
Having read Will's monster post on schools, I do not disagree with him. In fact, I would be pleased to see what he suggests become national policy. I just don't think it will solve the problem of inner-city, poor students largely attending, through apathy, convenience, or lack of access to truly good options, substandard schools.
Also, I notice that not once in his lengthy discourse does Will mention parents, people generally considered to play a crucial role in the succss of a child's education. I would be curious indeed to know what role Will envisions for them.
The Bank of Our Children's Future
Matthew Yglesias has pointed out a gimmick by Senator Lautenberg to draw attention to the danger of Bush's deficit spending, and complains that the Democrats haven't done enough to appeal to people's self-interest by pointing out that deficit spending will result in problems in many of their lifetimes also. It's not the lack of appeal to self-interest that dooms this appeal, rather it's the classic boy who cried wolf problem. I remember back in 1992 when the deficit was only $4 trillion and Ross Perot was warning of dire consequences by the year 2000 if spending continued unabated. Then the tech boom came along, and none of his predictions came true. People who have been politically conscious for longer than I have probably remember more examples of warnings of dire financial meltdowns in store for our country that have all been averted due to clever policies and fortuitious economic upturns. Hence, while they recognize that the deficit is a problem, they believe that next time, just like all the other times, the economy will turn around, or some politician will come up with a clever plan to put off the day of reckoning, and that this patter can continue indefinitely.
Obviously this is sheer lunacy, but who wants to run on a platform of tax increases and spending cuts? It's almost enough to make one wish that somehow the Supreme Court could rule unbabanced peacetime budgets unconstitutional.
Matthew Yglesias has pointed out a gimmick by Senator Lautenberg to draw attention to the danger of Bush's deficit spending, and complains that the Democrats haven't done enough to appeal to people's self-interest by pointing out that deficit spending will result in problems in many of their lifetimes also. It's not the lack of appeal to self-interest that dooms this appeal, rather it's the classic boy who cried wolf problem. I remember back in 1992 when the deficit was only $4 trillion and Ross Perot was warning of dire consequences by the year 2000 if spending continued unabated. Then the tech boom came along, and none of his predictions came true. People who have been politically conscious for longer than I have probably remember more examples of warnings of dire financial meltdowns in store for our country that have all been averted due to clever policies and fortuitious economic upturns. Hence, while they recognize that the deficit is a problem, they believe that next time, just like all the other times, the economy will turn around, or some politician will come up with a clever plan to put off the day of reckoning, and that this patter can continue indefinitely.
Obviously this is sheer lunacy, but who wants to run on a platform of tax increases and spending cuts? It's almost enough to make one wish that somehow the Supreme Court could rule unbabanced peacetime budgets unconstitutional.
Educational Standards
There's been a lot of talk tossed back and forth about good schools versus bad schools when it comes to educational choice. However, we need to be careful what we mean by a good school and a bad school. In California, at least, schools are ranked by percentage of students scoring at or above the 50th percentile on standardized tests. Proof of the sheer idiocy of this standard will be left to the reader.
In point of fact, the California Department of Education does not actually seem to be using percentiles to score their tests, since they seem to believe that the percentage of students scoring at or above the 50th percentile has increase in the past few years, something that should be impossible. Nevertheless, the problem with any sort of relative standards--those that rank schools according to the performace of other schools--is that in order to increase their rankings, the incentive for schools is to dump their worst-performing students on neighboring schools, thereby increasing their percentage of high-scoring students and decreasing their neighbors'. What results, in a medium-sized city like Santa Barbara at least, is a disgraceful game of hot-potato played with the poorest neighborhoods, with each local school lobbying to make sure that this potential group of underperformers doesn't end up in their district. Meanwhile, the better-performing schools jealously guard their stranglehold on the upper-middle-class neighborhoods chock full of PTA moms. The gerrymandered districts that result would be funny, if they weren't also a sad reflection of the extent to which good schools no longer see their mission as teaching, but as protecting the interests of the already advantaged.
Would school choice have stopped the problem? I doubt it. Our elementary school district had a fairly liberal transfer policy, but its major effect was merely to increase the concentration of upper-middle-class students in a few schools. Insofar as this rewarded those parents who were willing to invest a bit of effort in obtaining a good education for their children, this was a good thing. And insofar as most parents seemed to believe that their children were getting adequate educations in their home school district, perhaps there was nothing about which to complain. Nevertheless, the real problem remained that the good schools stayed good, and the bad schools devoted large amounts of effort to not coming out at the bottom of the heap.
Nor do I think Will's solution of apportioning money based upon students would solve the problem. To a large extent (though I'm not sure how much) money in the Goleta school district already was apportioned to schools based upon number of students. Nevertheless, the two best schools were among the smallest, and the worst schools the largest, and the best schools worked quite hard to keep it that way. For these schools, when the rest of the district saw their science, music, and art programs cut, the PTA stepped in to raise the tens of thousands of dollars necessary to maintain them. In fact, while the rest of the district faced overcrowding during my sixth grade year, my school had a classroom that was turned into an underseas kelp forest one semester, and an Egyptian tomb the next, with the contribution of much volunteer labor on the part of the parents. Keeping the school small meant, to a large degree, keeping down the number of slacking parents whose weight the others would have been required to pull.
No matter what program we enact, so long as "failing" is defined relatively, the incentive will always be merely to stay off the very bottom of the list. What is truly necessary for any progress to be possible is to define failure absolutely, which means specifying just what a school is supposed to teach children, and then judging whether or not they do so based upon whether or not the children know the material, not whether or not they know it better than some other group of children. However, were this to be done, I suspect we'd see the real problem--either the standards would have to be embarassingly low, or an embarassingly large number of schools would be classed as failing.
There's been a lot of talk tossed back and forth about good schools versus bad schools when it comes to educational choice. However, we need to be careful what we mean by a good school and a bad school. In California, at least, schools are ranked by percentage of students scoring at or above the 50th percentile on standardized tests. Proof of the sheer idiocy of this standard will be left to the reader.
In point of fact, the California Department of Education does not actually seem to be using percentiles to score their tests, since they seem to believe that the percentage of students scoring at or above the 50th percentile has increase in the past few years, something that should be impossible. Nevertheless, the problem with any sort of relative standards--those that rank schools according to the performace of other schools--is that in order to increase their rankings, the incentive for schools is to dump their worst-performing students on neighboring schools, thereby increasing their percentage of high-scoring students and decreasing their neighbors'. What results, in a medium-sized city like Santa Barbara at least, is a disgraceful game of hot-potato played with the poorest neighborhoods, with each local school lobbying to make sure that this potential group of underperformers doesn't end up in their district. Meanwhile, the better-performing schools jealously guard their stranglehold on the upper-middle-class neighborhoods chock full of PTA moms. The gerrymandered districts that result would be funny, if they weren't also a sad reflection of the extent to which good schools no longer see their mission as teaching, but as protecting the interests of the already advantaged.
Would school choice have stopped the problem? I doubt it. Our elementary school district had a fairly liberal transfer policy, but its major effect was merely to increase the concentration of upper-middle-class students in a few schools. Insofar as this rewarded those parents who were willing to invest a bit of effort in obtaining a good education for their children, this was a good thing. And insofar as most parents seemed to believe that their children were getting adequate educations in their home school district, perhaps there was nothing about which to complain. Nevertheless, the real problem remained that the good schools stayed good, and the bad schools devoted large amounts of effort to not coming out at the bottom of the heap.
Nor do I think Will's solution of apportioning money based upon students would solve the problem. To a large extent (though I'm not sure how much) money in the Goleta school district already was apportioned to schools based upon number of students. Nevertheless, the two best schools were among the smallest, and the worst schools the largest, and the best schools worked quite hard to keep it that way. For these schools, when the rest of the district saw their science, music, and art programs cut, the PTA stepped in to raise the tens of thousands of dollars necessary to maintain them. In fact, while the rest of the district faced overcrowding during my sixth grade year, my school had a classroom that was turned into an underseas kelp forest one semester, and an Egyptian tomb the next, with the contribution of much volunteer labor on the part of the parents. Keeping the school small meant, to a large degree, keeping down the number of slacking parents whose weight the others would have been required to pull.
No matter what program we enact, so long as "failing" is defined relatively, the incentive will always be merely to stay off the very bottom of the list. What is truly necessary for any progress to be possible is to define failure absolutely, which means specifying just what a school is supposed to teach children, and then judging whether or not they do so based upon whether or not the children know the material, not whether or not they know it better than some other group of children. However, were this to be done, I suspect we'd see the real problem--either the standards would have to be embarassingly low, or an embarassingly large number of schools would be classed as failing.
Tuesday, May 13, 2003
Wow... I... wow. It's been a long time.
Probably a silly question, but: what does "Crescat Sententia" mean?
Probably a silly question, but: what does "Crescat Sententia" mean?
Posting:
I am preparing some post(s) for tomorrow. After all, I can't let Peter post more frequently than me. Besides... this was my horoscope:
"Some people tend to make mountains out of molehills. Currently, you're likely to feel as though you're surrounded by people who exaggerate problems. You, on the other hand, have a loftier perspective. You are a visionary who can foresee future social trends. This gift would serve you well as a political speechwriter, should you want to take on that sort of job."
We'll see if I can fulfill the prophecy soon enough.
I am preparing some post(s) for tomorrow. After all, I can't let Peter post more frequently than me. Besides... this was my horoscope:
"Some people tend to make mountains out of molehills. Currently, you're likely to feel as though you're surrounded by people who exaggerate problems. You, on the other hand, have a loftier perspective. You are a visionary who can foresee future social trends. This gift would serve you well as a political speechwriter, should you want to take on that sort of job."
We'll see if I can fulfill the prophecy soon enough.
Monday, May 12, 2003
Quickie
Juan Non-Volokh has a post on whether immigrants are sufficiently black. Good, but I think he misses a major point, which is the immigrants are not a random sample of the population of their country. Rather immigrants are the ones with sufficient drive, resources, connections, adventurousness or creativity to migrate. One would expect these same traits to help them succeed out of proportion to a random sample of the population.
Juan Non-Volokh has a post on whether immigrants are sufficiently black. Good, but I think he misses a major point, which is the immigrants are not a random sample of the population of their country. Rather immigrants are the ones with sufficient drive, resources, connections, adventurousness or creativity to migrate. One would expect these same traits to help them succeed out of proportion to a random sample of the population.
My Other Hobby
Due to an upcoming ballet performance, my posting volume will continue to remain light for the rest of the week. But for those of you in Chicago, University Ballet is putting on a Tribute to the Great Ballets at International House may 16th and 17th. Tickets will be on sale at the Reynold's Club Marketplace between 11 and 2 all of this week, and after this weekend's rehearsals I can confidently say that it promises to be a great show.
Due to an upcoming ballet performance, my posting volume will continue to remain light for the rest of the week. But for those of you in Chicago, University Ballet is putting on a Tribute to the Great Ballets at International House may 16th and 17th. Tickets will be on sale at the Reynold's Club Marketplace between 11 and 2 all of this week, and after this weekend's rehearsals I can confidently say that it promises to be a great show.
Drawing Lines in Shifting Sand
Will has complained about the "fetus as human when viable" argument because it gets us into all sorts of philosophical tangles. The problem is that the "life begins at birth" position doesn't really get us out of them. If the fact that humanity results merely from moving from point a (the womb) to point b (the hospital bassinet) doesn't strike you as bothersome, or that a fetus born prematurely at seven months and unable to breathe for itself is human while a nine month old fetus that will be born tomorrow is not isn't problematic, consider this thought experiment. Suppose we could develop a technology that would allow us to put prematurely born babies back inside their mothers. Would they be human when they were born for the first time, then become not-human again when they went back inside the womb? And while we're on the subject, what about identical twins? When one is born and other has not yet, is one human and the other not?
And to be an equal-opportunity spoilsport, for those who say that life begins at conception, suppose we perfect our cloning technology so that any cell in a person's body is only a few laboratory processes away from becoming a zygote, capable of developing into a fully-grown human, eighteen years down the road. Is each of a person's cells then an independent human life? Obviously not. Now suppose we started cloning humans. We want to give the clones human status, but we don't want to give single cells human status. So where do we draw the line? The first cell division? Implantation in the womb? Viability? Birth?
The reason that abortion remains such a divisive issue is not because half the country in incapable of understanding a reasoned argument. It's because no matter where you draw the line, you're trying to find a sharp distinction in a process that is inherently gradual.
Will has complained about the "fetus as human when viable" argument because it gets us into all sorts of philosophical tangles. The problem is that the "life begins at birth" position doesn't really get us out of them. If the fact that humanity results merely from moving from point a (the womb) to point b (the hospital bassinet) doesn't strike you as bothersome, or that a fetus born prematurely at seven months and unable to breathe for itself is human while a nine month old fetus that will be born tomorrow is not isn't problematic, consider this thought experiment. Suppose we could develop a technology that would allow us to put prematurely born babies back inside their mothers. Would they be human when they were born for the first time, then become not-human again when they went back inside the womb? And while we're on the subject, what about identical twins? When one is born and other has not yet, is one human and the other not?
And to be an equal-opportunity spoilsport, for those who say that life begins at conception, suppose we perfect our cloning technology so that any cell in a person's body is only a few laboratory processes away from becoming a zygote, capable of developing into a fully-grown human, eighteen years down the road. Is each of a person's cells then an independent human life? Obviously not. Now suppose we started cloning humans. We want to give the clones human status, but we don't want to give single cells human status. So where do we draw the line? The first cell division? Implantation in the womb? Viability? Birth?
The reason that abortion remains such a divisive issue is not because half the country in incapable of understanding a reasoned argument. It's because no matter where you draw the line, you're trying to find a sharp distinction in a process that is inherently gradual.
Thursday, May 08, 2003
Scav
Of all people, Matt Yglesias is in on the ScavHunt shenanigans. I would also suggest calling those numbers, but do it on behalf of the Lush Puppies: FIST team.
Of all people, Matt Yglesias is in on the ScavHunt shenanigans. I would also suggest calling those numbers, but do it on behalf of the Lush Puppies: FIST team.
Wednesday, May 07, 2003
Gilmore Girls
Slate just posted an article on the Gilmore Girls, a show much beloved by much of this blog. It's a good article, but there are several points with which I have to take issue. Heffernan writes:
While it's true that Gilmore Girls is lacking in vice by the standards of modern television, it's hardly a throwback to the fifties. The only character who is truly anti-sex and anti-rock is portrayed as amusingly out of synch with the world around her, and her daughter's inevitable rebellion as a positive step in her development. Nevertheless, she is also portrayed as motivated by a genuine concern for her daughter's welfare.
This, ultimately, is what makes the show so good. Instead of relying on stereotypes, or creating characters with problems beyond the ken of most ordinary mortals, the show recognizes that the fodder for drama in the lives of ordinary people--family fights, breakups, concerns over money--can also make compelling television.
Slate just posted an article on the Gilmore Girls, a show much beloved by much of this blog. It's a good article, but there are several points with which I have to take issue. Heffernan writes:
Like other WB producers, Amy Sherman-Palladino, the creator and executive producer of Gilmore Girls, has meticulously created a world so protected and old-fashioned that people's minor transgressions (listening to rock 'n' roll, having sex before marriage) still count as transgressions, and still have compelling moral consequences.
While it's true that Gilmore Girls is lacking in vice by the standards of modern television, it's hardly a throwback to the fifties. The only character who is truly anti-sex and anti-rock is portrayed as amusingly out of synch with the world around her, and her daughter's inevitable rebellion as a positive step in her development. Nevertheless, she is also portrayed as motivated by a genuine concern for her daughter's welfare.
This, ultimately, is what makes the show so good. Instead of relying on stereotypes, or creating characters with problems beyond the ken of most ordinary mortals, the show recognizes that the fodder for drama in the lives of ordinary people--family fights, breakups, concerns over money--can also make compelling television.
Well of course...
If you're going to put lemon in your tea, of course you're going to kill all of the tea flavor. A good cup of tea should be subtly perfumed. A good squirt of lemon juice should be assertively sour. Lemon only belongs in iced tea, which is brewed to be about twice as strong, and hence needs the acidity to counteract the bitterness that results. To learn how to brew a sublime cup of tea, go here. (Yes, I realize the site is in French. If there is demand, I will post a translation of the pertinent information.)
If you're going to put lemon in your tea, of course you're going to kill all of the tea flavor. A good cup of tea should be subtly perfumed. A good squirt of lemon juice should be assertively sour. Lemon only belongs in iced tea, which is brewed to be about twice as strong, and hence needs the acidity to counteract the bitterness that results. To learn how to brew a sublime cup of tea, go here. (Yes, I realize the site is in French. If there is demand, I will post a translation of the pertinent information.)
Political Advertising Hijinks
I blogged not too long ago on the Club for Growth's attempts to beat Sen. Olympia Snowe into submission over Bush's tax breaks. Sen. Snowe (R-ME) and Sen. Voinovich (R-OH) are two of Bush's key opponents in his quest to bankrupt the United States. The Club for Growth supports Bush in his quest. And, despite a new poll in which over 70% of Mainers expressed their disapproval with Bush's tax cut plan, the Club is at it again. However, they're running into some interesting legal issues.
This is where the new political advertising limits become relevant. Being entirely unaware of the legal ramifications of all this, I defer to Will on his interpretation. My assumption is that ruling in question is the recent one by a special federal panel striking down certain parts of the McCain-Feingold bill. Anyway... see the Bangor Daily News article for more info on the differing interpreations at work here. Is it possible that the Club for Growth could be reprimanded if it turns out that the court agrees with Mr. McCain's interpreation of the ruling? That would be nice. Will, what you got to say?
Ignoring the conservative French-bashers for a moment, some Republican has proposed a compromise between Bush's $550B tax cuts and the $350B cuts supported by Snowe and Voinovich. However, the $450B proposal has lost another supporter in Sen. Susan Collins, the other Maine Senator. This is going to be a difficult fight. How about we just scrap these tax cuts entirely... after all, they are the primary reason this country is about to run even heavier deficits.
I blogged not too long ago on the Club for Growth's attempts to beat Sen. Olympia Snowe into submission over Bush's tax breaks. Sen. Snowe (R-ME) and Sen. Voinovich (R-OH) are two of Bush's key opponents in his quest to bankrupt the United States. The Club for Growth supports Bush in his quest. And, despite a new poll in which over 70% of Mainers expressed their disapproval with Bush's tax cut plan, the Club is at it again. However, they're running into some interesting legal issues.
This is where the new political advertising limits become relevant. Being entirely unaware of the legal ramifications of all this, I defer to Will on his interpretation. My assumption is that ruling in question is the recent one by a special federal panel striking down certain parts of the McCain-Feingold bill. Anyway... see the Bangor Daily News article for more info on the differing interpreations at work here. Is it possible that the Club for Growth could be reprimanded if it turns out that the court agrees with Mr. McCain's interpreation of the ruling? That would be nice. Will, what you got to say?
Ignoring the conservative French-bashers for a moment, some Republican has proposed a compromise between Bush's $550B tax cuts and the $350B cuts supported by Snowe and Voinovich. However, the $450B proposal has lost another supporter in Sen. Susan Collins, the other Maine Senator. This is going to be a difficult fight. How about we just scrap these tax cuts entirely... after all, they are the primary reason this country is about to run even heavier deficits.
Murder in Maine
I have indeed been following the events in New Sweden, Maine. I had planned to post on the series of mysteries at some point, but since Will beat me to the punch... Being a Mainer, I recognize that, while this would be big news anywhere, it is particularly huge in a state that only had 19 murders last year, and 11 the year before that. The shock and awe of the situation is exacerbated by the small size of the town. New Sweden is a town of 621 people... er, 619 now. (The town is roughly 280 miles north of my hometown of Lewiston/Auburn) The story progressed as such...
On April 27, the Gustaf Adolph Evangelical Lutheran Church held its typical after-service reception in the basement of the church. But something was amiss! The churchgoers were served arsenic-laced coffee on that morning, and the result was 15 ill and 1 dead. Residents were shocked. How could something like this happen in a small, close-knit community? After all, this is the type of place which is supposed to have, and which appeared to have, exactly the type of social trust which I have previously spoken about at length. The distress was recounted in detail by an article from Sat, May 3, in the Bangor Daily News:
Another account of the social aspects can be found in an article titled 'We have lost our innocence,' from the May 4 edition of the Portland Press-Herald.
The arsenic death was ultimately ruled a homicide, and the investigation took off. But the mystery doesn't end there; the ink had yet to dry on Saturday morning's newspaper before another man was dead. Daniel Bondeson had died in his New Sweden area home from gunshot wounds on Friday, May 2. Investigators initally had been silent on whether there was a suicide note but did say that the gunshot wounds appeared to be self-inflicted. On Sunday, it became clear that there was a suicide note, and that Bondeson's death was indeed related to the poisoning incident. The questions are: did he do it, and if so, did he act alone? Police have been sketchy on the details of the note, but they say Bondeson apologized for the poisoning. What exactly this apology entails, I am unaware. Police believe more than one person may be behind the tragedies, while an FBI profiling believes Bondeson acted alone.
Even after determining just who was behind all this is discovered, there will be many more questions for New Swedenites. For instance: why? What possible motivation could Mr. Bondeson have had to poison his fellow parishioners? Bondeson's family is unable to believe the accusations against him. Also, how does a town recover from having it's social foundation rocked so heavily? Can innocence be regained for New Sweden? Another woman had died in New Sweden of natural causes on the same day as Mr. Bondeson. Three deaths and 15 illnesses is a lot for a town to overcome. But there are signs that trust will be rebuilt, as seen in this Press-Herald article:
In today's midday report of the Press-Herald online, there are some encouraging words from one of the victims:
Social trust can return to New Sweden, and I'm confident that rebuilding it will not take an exorbitant amount of time either. After all, if the victims can forgive and forget, they're well on their way.
I have indeed been following the events in New Sweden, Maine. I had planned to post on the series of mysteries at some point, but since Will beat me to the punch... Being a Mainer, I recognize that, while this would be big news anywhere, it is particularly huge in a state that only had 19 murders last year, and 11 the year before that. The shock and awe of the situation is exacerbated by the small size of the town. New Sweden is a town of 621 people... er, 619 now. (The town is roughly 280 miles north of my hometown of Lewiston/Auburn) The story progressed as such...
On April 27, the Gustaf Adolph Evangelical Lutheran Church held its typical after-service reception in the basement of the church. But something was amiss! The churchgoers were served arsenic-laced coffee on that morning, and the result was 15 ill and 1 dead. Residents were shocked. How could something like this happen in a small, close-knit community? After all, this is the type of place which is supposed to have, and which appeared to have, exactly the type of social trust which I have previously spoken about at length. The distress was recounted in detail by an article from Sat, May 3, in the Bangor Daily News:
"To hear Dan Rather saying to the whole nation that this could be poison ... when he said the M-word, I just started to cry," [Brenda Nasberg Jepson] said.
"We're left with no choice but to realize there's someone among us who could be a murderer. You realize that you might have sat by someone at a church service, you might have exchanged potluck dishes, and the whole time, they were capable of something like this," she said. "I can't tell you what a sinister feeling that is."
[...]
"We were hoping that some terrorist in another country had put something in the coffee [grounds]," agreed Elaine Jepson, who has lived on a 280-acre potato farm in town since she married her husband, Floyd, 55 years ago. "The fear is that it's going to be somebody that we know."
Another account of the social aspects can be found in an article titled 'We have lost our innocence,' from the May 4 edition of the Portland Press-Herald.
The arsenic death was ultimately ruled a homicide, and the investigation took off. But the mystery doesn't end there; the ink had yet to dry on Saturday morning's newspaper before another man was dead. Daniel Bondeson had died in his New Sweden area home from gunshot wounds on Friday, May 2. Investigators initally had been silent on whether there was a suicide note but did say that the gunshot wounds appeared to be self-inflicted. On Sunday, it became clear that there was a suicide note, and that Bondeson's death was indeed related to the poisoning incident. The questions are: did he do it, and if so, did he act alone? Police have been sketchy on the details of the note, but they say Bondeson apologized for the poisoning. What exactly this apology entails, I am unaware. Police believe more than one person may be behind the tragedies, while an FBI profiling believes Bondeson acted alone.
Even after determining just who was behind all this is discovered, there will be many more questions for New Swedenites. For instance: why? What possible motivation could Mr. Bondeson have had to poison his fellow parishioners? Bondeson's family is unable to believe the accusations against him. Also, how does a town recover from having it's social foundation rocked so heavily? Can innocence be regained for New Sweden? Another woman had died in New Sweden of natural causes on the same day as Mr. Bondeson. Three deaths and 15 illnesses is a lot for a town to overcome. But there are signs that trust will be rebuilt, as seen in this Press-Herald article:
[The Swedish] Club leaders decided to hold the meeting at the Evangelical Covenant Church. It was a low turnout, about 15 people. Some members had wondered if anyone would drink any coffee at all, but they drank more than usual that night. ...
The video and the pamphlets provided a much-needed diversion, Nasbert Jepson said.
"It was quite calming, something that helps you get through," she said. "We are just trying to show that we are not going to let these tragedies ruin our lives."
In today's midday report of the Press-Herald online, there are some encouraging words from one of the victims:
[Erich] Margeson knew Daniel Bondeson well, and it is difficult for him to grasp that Bondeson could be linked to the poisonings, as police have said.
"He was a person that was always there to lend a helping hand if needed," Margeson said.
[...]
Margeson said he is not angry about Bondeson's alleged role, only "mildly curious."
"I just don't have any reason to be upset with him," Margeson said. "No one knows enough about what happened that I should be upset. . . . Later on, as more information comes out, I might have some peace of mind about why things happened, but I'm really more interested in seeing all of us involved go back home and get out of the hospital and get back to normal."
Social trust can return to New Sweden, and I'm confident that rebuilding it will not take an exorbitant amount of time either. After all, if the victims can forgive and forget, they're well on their way.
No Thanks
Will, speaking on originalism, (perhaps somewhat facetiously) writes:
But if history is supposed to be the guide to constitutional interpretation, then I must ask the Justice the same question he asked the audience. Why have it done by lawyers? There's an army of underappreciated history scholars out there, some of them on this very blog. I'm sure they'd be happy to accept the task.
Actually, out of my great respect for the discipline of history, I have no desire to accept this task at all, and I would hope that no reasonable historian would wish to either. (Unfortunately, there is no shortage of unreasonable historians studying American history, so I suspect Will would have to beat back the volunteers, but that's a complaint for another day.) The problem is that there is no way to interpret the constitution according to original intent without doing gross insult to history. America in 1789 is different than America in 2003. Our instututions are different, our values are different, our goals are different, our words even mean different things now than they did then. Trying to reconstruct the understanding of the Constitution our Founding Fathers in order to apply it to our current world would be like trying to recreate the Colonial system of roads to serve the needs of today's automotive society.
Fredrich Nietzsche wrote on the pitfalls in applying the lessons of history to contemporary life in On the Use and Abuse of History for Life:
Now, what purpose is served for contemporary man by the monumental consideration of the past, busying ourselves with the classics and rarities of earlier times? He derives from that the fact that the greatness which was once there at all events once was possible and therefore will really be possible once again. He goes along his path more bravely, for now the doubt which falls over him in weaker hours, that he might perhaps be wishing for the impossible, is beaten back from the field. Let us assume that somebody believes it would take no more than a hundred productive men, effective people brought up in a new spirit, to get rid of what has become trendy in German culture right now , how must it strengthen him to perceive that the culture of the Renaissance raised itself on the shoulders of such a crowd of a hundred men.
Nevertheless, to learn right away something new from the same example, how fleeting and weak, how imprecise that comparison would be! If the comparison is to carry out this powerful effect, how much of the difference will be missed in the process. How forcefully must the individuality of the past be wrenched into a general shape, with all its sharp corners and angles broken off for the sake of the correspondence! In fact, basically something that once was possible could appear possible a second time only if the Pythagoreans were correct in thinking that with the same constellations of the celestial bodies the same phenomena on the Earth had to repeat themselves, even in the small single particulars, so that when the stars have a certain position relative to each other, a Stoic and an Epicurean will, in an eternal recurrence, unite and assassinate Caesar, and with another stellar position Columbus will eternally rediscover America.
Only if the Earth were always to begin its theatrical performance once again after the fifth act, if it were certain that the same knot of motives, the same deus ex machina, the same catastrophe returned in the same determined interval, could the powerful man desire monumental history in complete iconic truth, that is, each fact in its precisely described characteristics and unity, and probably not before the time when astronomers have once again become astrologers. Until that time monumental history will not be able to produce that full truthfulness. It will always bring closer what is unlike, generalize, and finally make things equal. It will always tone down the difference in motives and events, in order to set down the monumental effectus [effect], that is, the exemplary effect worthy of imitation, at the cost of the causae [cause]. Thus, because monumental history turns away as much as possible from the cause, we can call it a collection of "effects in themselves" with less exaggeration than calling it events which will have an effect on all ages. What is celebrated in folk festivals and in religious or military remembrance days is basically such an "effect in itself." It is the thing which does not let the ambitious sleep, which for the enterprising lies like an amulet on the heart, but it is not the true historical interconnection between cause and effect, which fully recognized, would only prove that never again could anything completely the same fall out in the dice throw of future contingency.
But Nietzsche also recognizes that there are times when it is desirable to do bad history. The Founding Fathers represent a certain ideal in our society, no less powerful for its inaccuracy. It's not stupidity or historical illiteracy that cause originalists to seek smaller government and laws that promote virtue, despite the vast gulf that separates our our way of life from theirs. Rather, it is the seductiveness, the usefulness, of this vision that leads them to gloss over the impossibility of any meaningful return to the days of yore. The question is not really what values we held in the past. Historians are kidding themselves mightily if they believe that their recreation of the past, in and of itself, is valuable to anyone save themselves. The real question is what values, what principles, will guide us into the future. Only when we have found these can we cull the past for the stories, the heroes, that will inspire us to move forward.
Yes, historians might be more qualified than lawyers to say what the constitution meant to the founders. Honest historians will also say that the constitution did not mean the same thing to all the founders. Other historians--Marxians or Freudians, for instance--will be willing to argue that the constitution actually meant something different to the founders than they even thought it meant. But to make any of these interpretations general enough to apply also to contemporary society, one must strip away all of the specifics, all of the nuances, that gave it value in the first place. And having done this, one must rebuild the nuance, the specificity, on a framework no more meaningful than an historian's best guess as to how the Founding Fathers, on aggregate, would have responded to a telephone survey question, "Should we have a weak federal government? Press one if you strongly agree, two if you agree, three if you have no opinion, four if you disagree and five if you strongly disagree."
Thank you very much, but I'll take government by the lawyers instead.
Will, speaking on originalism, (perhaps somewhat facetiously) writes:
But if history is supposed to be the guide to constitutional interpretation, then I must ask the Justice the same question he asked the audience. Why have it done by lawyers? There's an army of underappreciated history scholars out there, some of them on this very blog. I'm sure they'd be happy to accept the task.
Actually, out of my great respect for the discipline of history, I have no desire to accept this task at all, and I would hope that no reasonable historian would wish to either. (Unfortunately, there is no shortage of unreasonable historians studying American history, so I suspect Will would have to beat back the volunteers, but that's a complaint for another day.) The problem is that there is no way to interpret the constitution according to original intent without doing gross insult to history. America in 1789 is different than America in 2003. Our instututions are different, our values are different, our goals are different, our words even mean different things now than they did then. Trying to reconstruct the understanding of the Constitution our Founding Fathers in order to apply it to our current world would be like trying to recreate the Colonial system of roads to serve the needs of today's automotive society.
Fredrich Nietzsche wrote on the pitfalls in applying the lessons of history to contemporary life in On the Use and Abuse of History for Life:
Now, what purpose is served for contemporary man by the monumental consideration of the past, busying ourselves with the classics and rarities of earlier times? He derives from that the fact that the greatness which was once there at all events once was possible and therefore will really be possible once again. He goes along his path more bravely, for now the doubt which falls over him in weaker hours, that he might perhaps be wishing for the impossible, is beaten back from the field. Let us assume that somebody believes it would take no more than a hundred productive men, effective people brought up in a new spirit, to get rid of what has become trendy in German culture right now , how must it strengthen him to perceive that the culture of the Renaissance raised itself on the shoulders of such a crowd of a hundred men.
Nevertheless, to learn right away something new from the same example, how fleeting and weak, how imprecise that comparison would be! If the comparison is to carry out this powerful effect, how much of the difference will be missed in the process. How forcefully must the individuality of the past be wrenched into a general shape, with all its sharp corners and angles broken off for the sake of the correspondence! In fact, basically something that once was possible could appear possible a second time only if the Pythagoreans were correct in thinking that with the same constellations of the celestial bodies the same phenomena on the Earth had to repeat themselves, even in the small single particulars, so that when the stars have a certain position relative to each other, a Stoic and an Epicurean will, in an eternal recurrence, unite and assassinate Caesar, and with another stellar position Columbus will eternally rediscover America.
Only if the Earth were always to begin its theatrical performance once again after the fifth act, if it were certain that the same knot of motives, the same deus ex machina, the same catastrophe returned in the same determined interval, could the powerful man desire monumental history in complete iconic truth, that is, each fact in its precisely described characteristics and unity, and probably not before the time when astronomers have once again become astrologers. Until that time monumental history will not be able to produce that full truthfulness. It will always bring closer what is unlike, generalize, and finally make things equal. It will always tone down the difference in motives and events, in order to set down the monumental effectus [effect], that is, the exemplary effect worthy of imitation, at the cost of the causae [cause]. Thus, because monumental history turns away as much as possible from the cause, we can call it a collection of "effects in themselves" with less exaggeration than calling it events which will have an effect on all ages. What is celebrated in folk festivals and in religious or military remembrance days is basically such an "effect in itself." It is the thing which does not let the ambitious sleep, which for the enterprising lies like an amulet on the heart, but it is not the true historical interconnection between cause and effect, which fully recognized, would only prove that never again could anything completely the same fall out in the dice throw of future contingency.
But Nietzsche also recognizes that there are times when it is desirable to do bad history. The Founding Fathers represent a certain ideal in our society, no less powerful for its inaccuracy. It's not stupidity or historical illiteracy that cause originalists to seek smaller government and laws that promote virtue, despite the vast gulf that separates our our way of life from theirs. Rather, it is the seductiveness, the usefulness, of this vision that leads them to gloss over the impossibility of any meaningful return to the days of yore. The question is not really what values we held in the past. Historians are kidding themselves mightily if they believe that their recreation of the past, in and of itself, is valuable to anyone save themselves. The real question is what values, what principles, will guide us into the future. Only when we have found these can we cull the past for the stories, the heroes, that will inspire us to move forward.
Yes, historians might be more qualified than lawyers to say what the constitution meant to the founders. Honest historians will also say that the constitution did not mean the same thing to all the founders. Other historians--Marxians or Freudians, for instance--will be willing to argue that the constitution actually meant something different to the founders than they even thought it meant. But to make any of these interpretations general enough to apply also to contemporary society, one must strip away all of the specifics, all of the nuances, that gave it value in the first place. And having done this, one must rebuild the nuance, the specificity, on a framework no more meaningful than an historian's best guess as to how the Founding Fathers, on aggregate, would have responded to a telephone survey question, "Should we have a weak federal government? Press one if you strongly agree, two if you agree, three if you have no opinion, four if you disagree and five if you strongly disagree."
Thank you very much, but I'll take government by the lawyers instead.
Tuesday, May 06, 2003
I too will be joining the incontinents in the second circle.
Miscellaneous & Missing Weapons:
I will be interning with the Green Independent Party in Portland, Maine this summer. And I'm headed for Limbo. The Libertarians are not faring well on the Hell test. Is it any question where Peter will end up? I'm more interested in Amy and Amanda's results.
Thanks to Amy for the link to Matt Yglesias' post on missing weapons in Iraq. I agree with both Amy and Matt's sentiments here. My worry from the beginning was that we would go into Iraq without letting the inspectors finish their job, leaving us with an incomplete account of just what Saddam had under his command. My second worry, which never seemed to be addressed by anyone, was that taking Saddam out leaves whatever weapons he had scattered all over the place. It would've been obviously stupid for Saddam to keep all his weapons in one pile under his bed, and taking him out leaves a slew of military commanders with control over weapons. (Of course, this is all assuming that they had weapons in the first place). Regardless, as I learned from John Mearsheimer, Saddam Hussein would have never sold or used WMDs. Why? Israel and America would've both responded immediately, possibly axiomatically, against Iraq had any WMDs been used in the Middle East. There certainly would not have been a long investigation into 'who bombed us.' Saddam must have known that letting WMDs out of the bag would have been virtual suicide. But... cut the big head off the monster, and what are you left with? Answer: a bunch of generals with control of WMDs who are not guided by the same principles of international relations. I'm sure there were some in the Iraqi military who support the idea of terrorist action against Israel and the US, and I'm sure they would have no qualms whatsoever of selling dangerous items to terrorist organizations. With Saddam out of the picture, whoever controls the weapons is able to do with them what they wish, and the rule of suicidal ensured destruction doesn't necessarily apply to them.
Now that there are missing weapons out there, a new threat has risen. Say some Iraqi General sold a nuke or a biological/chemical weapons to a terrorist group and that group attacks the US or Israel, who do we bomb then?
I will be interning with the Green Independent Party in Portland, Maine this summer. And I'm headed for Limbo. The Libertarians are not faring well on the Hell test. Is it any question where Peter will end up? I'm more interested in Amy and Amanda's results.
Thanks to Amy for the link to Matt Yglesias' post on missing weapons in Iraq. I agree with both Amy and Matt's sentiments here. My worry from the beginning was that we would go into Iraq without letting the inspectors finish their job, leaving us with an incomplete account of just what Saddam had under his command. My second worry, which never seemed to be addressed by anyone, was that taking Saddam out leaves whatever weapons he had scattered all over the place. It would've been obviously stupid for Saddam to keep all his weapons in one pile under his bed, and taking him out leaves a slew of military commanders with control over weapons. (Of course, this is all assuming that they had weapons in the first place). Regardless, as I learned from John Mearsheimer, Saddam Hussein would have never sold or used WMDs. Why? Israel and America would've both responded immediately, possibly axiomatically, against Iraq had any WMDs been used in the Middle East. There certainly would not have been a long investigation into 'who bombed us.' Saddam must have known that letting WMDs out of the bag would have been virtual suicide. But... cut the big head off the monster, and what are you left with? Answer: a bunch of generals with control of WMDs who are not guided by the same principles of international relations. I'm sure there were some in the Iraqi military who support the idea of terrorist action against Israel and the US, and I'm sure they would have no qualms whatsoever of selling dangerous items to terrorist organizations. With Saddam out of the picture, whoever controls the weapons is able to do with them what they wish, and the rule of suicidal ensured destruction doesn't necessarily apply to them.
Now that there are missing weapons out there, a new threat has risen. Say some Iraqi General sold a nuke or a biological/chemical weapons to a terrorist group and that group attacks the US or Israel, who do we bomb then?
Priorities?
So we can't track down missing radioactive material, but we do have the resources to go looking for missing zoo animals?
It's stories like these that remind me why I was dubious about our involvement in Iraq in the first place.
So we can't track down missing radioactive material, but we do have the resources to go looking for missing zoo animals?
It's stories like these that remind me why I was dubious about our involvement in Iraq in the first place.
Talent
Nick at Le Taon is feeling a lack of Eco in his life. With the goal of helping him remedy this deficiency, I've linked to an Eco piece that appeared a while ago in The Guardian on Alexandre Dumas. Eco wants to know why, of all the light fiction published during the ninteenth century in France, why do the works of Alexandre Dumas remain popular? He writes:
I discovered Dumas in junior high and devoured him. I loved the casual insoucance of the musketeers in the faces of danger, the bons mots as deft as their parries. I loved the contrast between Raoul's youthful innocence, and Athos' jaded cynicism--between D'Argatnon's early enthusiasm and later allegiance to the bureaucracy, between Milady's scheming manipulations, and the equally poisonous helplessness of Louise de la Valliere. But femme fatales, tragic beauties, young idealists, scheming councillers, and witty swordsmen proliferate like rabbits in popular fiction. It's a certain something--an ear for a turn of phrase, an intuitive flair for the dramatic, a mysterious ability to make the cliche seem new and dramatic--that lifts Dumas (and certain other popular writers) into the realm of the literary. I call it talent, and wish that I had it. Eco calls it "narrative strategy" and wants to dissect it, understand it, and recreate it. This is why I worship him.
The contrast between science and alchemy appears in several of Eco's books, such as The Island of the Day Before, and Foucault's Pendulum. Literature as it is practiced now is a lot like alchemy. The great authors have their systems, their inscrutable sourcebooks, their devil's pantry of talent and quintessence--and the rest of us see magic. Eco, however, sees methodologies to be stripped of their mystique and laid out for the benefit of us lead-footed writers. Reproducibility is the gold standard of science, and the philosopher's stone of Eco's literary criticism, and this can only be good. For even knowing there is no such thing as action at a distance, even finding the sleight-of-hand that keeps us coming back to the pages of The Three Musketeers, we will still accept the story, and we will still return. Such is the beauty of fiction.
Nick at Le Taon is feeling a lack of Eco in his life. With the goal of helping him remedy this deficiency, I've linked to an Eco piece that appeared a while ago in The Guardian on Alexandre Dumas. Eco wants to know why, of all the light fiction published during the ninteenth century in France, why do the works of Alexandre Dumas remain popular? He writes:
Therefore, are there virtues in writing which are not necessarily identified with linguistic creation, but are part of rhythm and shrewd dosage, and cross the boundary, albeit infinitesimally, between literature and light fiction?...Does the novel have to deepen the psychology of its heroes? Certainly the modern novel does, but the ancient legends did not do the same. Oedipus' psychology was deduced by Aeschylus or Freud, but the character is simply there, fixed in a pure and terribly disquieting state.
I discovered Dumas in junior high and devoured him. I loved the casual insoucance of the musketeers in the faces of danger, the bons mots as deft as their parries. I loved the contrast between Raoul's youthful innocence, and Athos' jaded cynicism--between D'Argatnon's early enthusiasm and later allegiance to the bureaucracy, between Milady's scheming manipulations, and the equally poisonous helplessness of Louise de la Valliere. But femme fatales, tragic beauties, young idealists, scheming councillers, and witty swordsmen proliferate like rabbits in popular fiction. It's a certain something--an ear for a turn of phrase, an intuitive flair for the dramatic, a mysterious ability to make the cliche seem new and dramatic--that lifts Dumas (and certain other popular writers) into the realm of the literary. I call it talent, and wish that I had it. Eco calls it "narrative strategy" and wants to dissect it, understand it, and recreate it. This is why I worship him.
The contrast between science and alchemy appears in several of Eco's books, such as The Island of the Day Before, and Foucault's Pendulum. Literature as it is practiced now is a lot like alchemy. The great authors have their systems, their inscrutable sourcebooks, their devil's pantry of talent and quintessence--and the rest of us see magic. Eco, however, sees methodologies to be stripped of their mystique and laid out for the benefit of us lead-footed writers. Reproducibility is the gold standard of science, and the philosopher's stone of Eco's literary criticism, and this can only be good. For even knowing there is no such thing as action at a distance, even finding the sleight-of-hand that keeps us coming back to the pages of The Three Musketeers, we will still accept the story, and we will still return. Such is the beauty of fiction.
Amy has chimed in on Bennett. She asserts that hypocrisy is not unethical.
Well, it certainly is not considered ethical. The best status hypocrisy can achieve is ethically/morally neutral. I would suggest that hypocrisy is a form of lying. It's the concept of saying one thing and doing another. There certainly was a reason Dante put the hypocrites deep in the thick of the Malebolge.
Bennett is saying that he, and everyone else for that matter, should follow traditional morals (he's against gambling, more specifically, through Empower America). However, he doesn't act in accordance with his words. Somehow, holding a public belief that one should act a certain way, while holding a private belief with contrary applications, seems dishonest and unethical.
Good words from the Private Intellectual below, as well.
Well, it certainly is not considered ethical. The best status hypocrisy can achieve is ethically/morally neutral. I would suggest that hypocrisy is a form of lying. It's the concept of saying one thing and doing another. There certainly was a reason Dante put the hypocrites deep in the thick of the Malebolge.
Bennett is saying that he, and everyone else for that matter, should follow traditional morals (he's against gambling, more specifically, through Empower America). However, he doesn't act in accordance with his words. Somehow, holding a public belief that one should act a certain way, while holding a private belief with contrary applications, seems dishonest and unethical.
Good words from the Private Intellectual below, as well.
X2
Despite all of the blogspace given to the new X-Men sequel, nobody seems to have pointed out something that I found significant—that X2 demonstrates one of the positive sides to Hollywood’s love of franchises. Knowing that they will have several movie in which to tell their story, action directors seem more willing to create and develop complex characters to drive their effects-laden plots. If the fourth Austin Powers movie is the price one has to pay for finding out in X3 if there’s any more of a common cause to be had between Magneto and Xaviar, this does not strike me as a particularly bad deal.
And on a completely unrelated note: attending the 12:01 premier of X2 was the only time I have ever seen longer lines for the men’s restrooms at a movie theater than for the women’s.
Despite all of the blogspace given to the new X-Men sequel, nobody seems to have pointed out something that I found significant—that X2 demonstrates one of the positive sides to Hollywood’s love of franchises. Knowing that they will have several movie in which to tell their story, action directors seem more willing to create and develop complex characters to drive their effects-laden plots. If the fourth Austin Powers movie is the price one has to pay for finding out in X3 if there’s any more of a common cause to be had between Magneto and Xaviar, this does not strike me as a particularly bad deal.
And on a completely unrelated note: attending the 12:01 premier of X2 was the only time I have ever seen longer lines for the men’s restrooms at a movie theater than for the women’s.
Is Hypocrisy Unethical?
In general, I am against people who advocate having the government tell you how to live your life. Hence, I have never been much of a fan of Bill Bennett. However, I cannot say that the exposure of his gambling habit has made me any less of a fan than I was previously. Yes, his personal habits are rather ironic, and I certainly enjoyed reading Kinsey’s gleeful denunciation, but I do not see how this is anything more than spurious ad hominem reasoning. Who wrote something should not affect our judgment of what is written. Whether Bill Bennett’s books are written by a candidate for sainthood, a man with a predilection for slot machines, or a drug addict who supports his habit through a life of crime, the validity of the argument remains the same.
For a political figure, the calculus is somewhat different since voters elect a person, not a book, and it is at least not entirely unreasonable to believe that a person who shows poor judgment in one area of their life may show the same quality of judgment in other areas at other times. Nevertheless, I fail to see how hypocrisy alone, absent other violations such as lying, constitutes an ethical violation. If Bennett gambled illegally, or if Bennett claimed he did not gamble, these would be ethical violations. But the gist of Bennett’s arguments, as I understand them, is not that people should live like him, but that the government should make people live closer to the manner in which he thinks ideal people ought to live. Were one so inclined, one could even advance Bennett himself as the best argument for his case—absent government prohibitions, even upright, well-intentioned individuals such as himself can be led into rationalizing and embracing vice. Given political realities, Bennett’s gambling habit is unwise, but hardly unethical.
Update: The Private Intellectual has weighed in, and I remain unconvinced. Bennett's arguments are bad whether or not he himself is as virtuous as he wants us to be. However the proper response to Bennett's private vice is no more a public shaming than the proper response to someone who believes that property is theft is to remove their property from their possession. Bennett's fellow virtuecrats will probably administer such a shaming, but for anyone who believes in the desirability of a right to private sin to join them in doing so is gross inconsistency.
In general, I am against people who advocate having the government tell you how to live your life. Hence, I have never been much of a fan of Bill Bennett. However, I cannot say that the exposure of his gambling habit has made me any less of a fan than I was previously. Yes, his personal habits are rather ironic, and I certainly enjoyed reading Kinsey’s gleeful denunciation, but I do not see how this is anything more than spurious ad hominem reasoning. Who wrote something should not affect our judgment of what is written. Whether Bill Bennett’s books are written by a candidate for sainthood, a man with a predilection for slot machines, or a drug addict who supports his habit through a life of crime, the validity of the argument remains the same.
For a political figure, the calculus is somewhat different since voters elect a person, not a book, and it is at least not entirely unreasonable to believe that a person who shows poor judgment in one area of their life may show the same quality of judgment in other areas at other times. Nevertheless, I fail to see how hypocrisy alone, absent other violations such as lying, constitutes an ethical violation. If Bennett gambled illegally, or if Bennett claimed he did not gamble, these would be ethical violations. But the gist of Bennett’s arguments, as I understand them, is not that people should live like him, but that the government should make people live closer to the manner in which he thinks ideal people ought to live. Were one so inclined, one could even advance Bennett himself as the best argument for his case—absent government prohibitions, even upright, well-intentioned individuals such as himself can be led into rationalizing and embracing vice. Given political realities, Bennett’s gambling habit is unwise, but hardly unethical.
Update: The Private Intellectual has weighed in, and I remain unconvinced. Bennett's arguments are bad whether or not he himself is as virtuous as he wants us to be. However the proper response to Bennett's private vice is no more a public shaming than the proper response to someone who believes that property is theft is to remove their property from their possession. Bennett's fellow virtuecrats will probably administer such a shaming, but for anyone who believes in the desirability of a right to private sin to join them in doing so is gross inconsistency.
Monday, May 05, 2003
Eugene Volokh has an interesting post on the Bill Bennett scandal. He asks which is worse: Bennett's gambling or the divulgence of private information by casino employees? For Volokh, the direct harm caused to Bennett by the violation of his privacy is more unethical than Bennett's actions, provided that he had not lied to the public or his family.
I am somewhat unconvinced by this. Indeed, sometimes private details must be exposed for a higher reason. Pres. Clinton rightfully vetoed a bill that would have criminalized the disclosure of classified information by government officials. I think we would all like to know when the government is doing something nefarious. Information is essential to the workings of a democratic government. Volokh refers to pornography purchases as a private exchange, as well. Surely, blabbing people's porn purchases around town could be considered unethical. But this is not always so when such information is vital to society/government. I believe it was in the Clarence Thomas hearings that the porn purchasing habits of a judicial nominee became a very public, center-stage issue. Certainly, in this case, it would have been unethical for the porn dealer to withhold information about his client.
Granted, the gambling habits of a Conservative talking head are not of the same substance as nefarious government plots or troubled judicial nominations. However, there seems to be some relevance to exposing the hypocritical attitudes of someone who argues "...that government has a responsibility to craft and uphold laws that help educate citizens about right and wrong." Bennett has portrayed a certain image of his values of right and wrong to the American people, and that image has proven to be a distortion of facts. This information may indeed color people’s attitudes about him and his words.
Ethics are a sticky question in this case, for sure. But I'm not ready to absolve Bennett of wrong doing just yet. I’m not sure I could defend the casino employees or managers entirely either. However, given the widespread deception perpetuated by a supposed man of morals, I would say that Bennett acted more unethically.
I am somewhat unconvinced by this. Indeed, sometimes private details must be exposed for a higher reason. Pres. Clinton rightfully vetoed a bill that would have criminalized the disclosure of classified information by government officials. I think we would all like to know when the government is doing something nefarious. Information is essential to the workings of a democratic government. Volokh refers to pornography purchases as a private exchange, as well. Surely, blabbing people's porn purchases around town could be considered unethical. But this is not always so when such information is vital to society/government. I believe it was in the Clarence Thomas hearings that the porn purchasing habits of a judicial nominee became a very public, center-stage issue. Certainly, in this case, it would have been unethical for the porn dealer to withhold information about his client.
Granted, the gambling habits of a Conservative talking head are not of the same substance as nefarious government plots or troubled judicial nominations. However, there seems to be some relevance to exposing the hypocritical attitudes of someone who argues "...that government has a responsibility to craft and uphold laws that help educate citizens about right and wrong." Bennett has portrayed a certain image of his values of right and wrong to the American people, and that image has proven to be a distortion of facts. This information may indeed color people’s attitudes about him and his words.
Ethics are a sticky question in this case, for sure. But I'm not ready to absolve Bennett of wrong doing just yet. I’m not sure I could defend the casino employees or managers entirely either. However, given the widespread deception perpetuated by a supposed man of morals, I would say that Bennett acted more unethically.
History Lesson
Oxblog has a good post on Islamic Fundamentalism, but their history is rather shaky. David Adesnik writes:
First of all, what is the difference between an 'Islamic' and a 'fundamentalist' state? Reading the papers, one gets the sense that a fundamentalist state is one in which the political order is an extension of Islamic law and in which Muslim clerics have a dominant political role. In contrast, an Islamic state may be something like the Christian republics of Europe where there is an official church but its presence is not all that important.
I'm not quite sure what Mr. Adesnik means by "all that important" but by any reasonable definition I don't see how it can describe the Christian Church in Europe during any part of the medieval or early modern period. In medieval Europe, church law governed matters as diverse as marriages, contracts, interest rates, and the work week, it demanded a tax of 10% from all inhabitants of Christian Europe, and the church claimed the right to punish those guilty of sex crimes, heresy, or witchcraft. Even so-called secular law often prohibited adultery, blasphemy, excessive richness of dress, or the exercise of any religion other than the approved version of Christianity. Maiming was a popular punishment for many crimes, like theft or lying. Churchmen played a major role in every European government (think Richelieu, Mazarin, Woolsey, or Laud) as advisors to the king, and during the early middle ages had a virtual monopoly on government bureaucratic appointments by virtue of their being the only source of educated men to keep records. Religious tolerance didn't come to England until the early 18th century, or France until the French Revolution. Executions for heresy were widespread throughout the sixteenth century, and witchcraft trials survived in some areas of Europe well into the eighteenth. While some places in Europe may stand out as relative oases of liberty and tolerance, none of these regimes would be seen as anyting other than unacceptably repressive were they to be reconstituted today.
There were in fact several considerations that made Christian Europe less oppressive than today's theocracies. Medieval governments were rudimentary--much less well-funded, and much less well armed, allowing, for instance, the ten percent Huguenot minority in France to fight the government to a standstill in the sixteenth century. Furthermore, fines were an important source of revenue for lords and kings, making monetary penalties much more attractive than physical punishments for all except for major crimes. Finally, there was a strong belief that the letter of the law needed to be tempered with Christian mercy that frequently, though not always, moderated punishments against those guilty of religious infractions. Nevertheless, European history is hardly the place to look for happily religious liberal democracies. If Europe shows anything, it shows that liberalization was inexorably tied to the secularization of politics.
Oxblog has a good post on Islamic Fundamentalism, but their history is rather shaky. David Adesnik writes:
First of all, what is the difference between an 'Islamic' and a 'fundamentalist' state? Reading the papers, one gets the sense that a fundamentalist state is one in which the political order is an extension of Islamic law and in which Muslim clerics have a dominant political role. In contrast, an Islamic state may be something like the Christian republics of Europe where there is an official church but its presence is not all that important.
I'm not quite sure what Mr. Adesnik means by "all that important" but by any reasonable definition I don't see how it can describe the Christian Church in Europe during any part of the medieval or early modern period. In medieval Europe, church law governed matters as diverse as marriages, contracts, interest rates, and the work week, it demanded a tax of 10% from all inhabitants of Christian Europe, and the church claimed the right to punish those guilty of sex crimes, heresy, or witchcraft. Even so-called secular law often prohibited adultery, blasphemy, excessive richness of dress, or the exercise of any religion other than the approved version of Christianity. Maiming was a popular punishment for many crimes, like theft or lying. Churchmen played a major role in every European government (think Richelieu, Mazarin, Woolsey, or Laud) as advisors to the king, and during the early middle ages had a virtual monopoly on government bureaucratic appointments by virtue of their being the only source of educated men to keep records. Religious tolerance didn't come to England until the early 18th century, or France until the French Revolution. Executions for heresy were widespread throughout the sixteenth century, and witchcraft trials survived in some areas of Europe well into the eighteenth. While some places in Europe may stand out as relative oases of liberty and tolerance, none of these regimes would be seen as anyting other than unacceptably repressive were they to be reconstituted today.
There were in fact several considerations that made Christian Europe less oppressive than today's theocracies. Medieval governments were rudimentary--much less well-funded, and much less well armed, allowing, for instance, the ten percent Huguenot minority in France to fight the government to a standstill in the sixteenth century. Furthermore, fines were an important source of revenue for lords and kings, making monetary penalties much more attractive than physical punishments for all except for major crimes. Finally, there was a strong belief that the letter of the law needed to be tempered with Christian mercy that frequently, though not always, moderated punishments against those guilty of religious infractions. Nevertheless, European history is hardly the place to look for happily religious liberal democracies. If Europe shows anything, it shows that liberalization was inexorably tied to the secularization of politics.
Friday, May 02, 2003
Still More on Incest:
After a bit of journal-searching on the subject of incest, it turns out that incest prohibitions are not nearly as universal as people claim. Royal incest is surprisingly common--among others, the Egyptian, Incan, Polynesian, and Hawaiian monarchies (and sometimes the high nobility) all practiced brother-sister marriage. Many people regard these cases as the exceptions that prove the rule. That only families claiming to harbor deities could violate the incest taboo shows not just the strength of such families, but also the strength of the taboo for the rest of society. Nevertheless, this doesn't explain the case of incest in Late-Roman Egypt, where brother-sister marriage was practiced by people of all social classes for at least several centuries. ("Husbands and Wives: Inheritance and Work Brother-Sister Marriage in Roman Egypt" Keith Hopkins, Comparative Studies in Society and History, Vol. 22, No. 3. (Jul., 1980), pp. 303-354.) There goes my plan to justify calling incest obviously irrational (like suicide) based upon universal prohibition.
After a bit of journal-searching on the subject of incest, it turns out that incest prohibitions are not nearly as universal as people claim. Royal incest is surprisingly common--among others, the Egyptian, Incan, Polynesian, and Hawaiian monarchies (and sometimes the high nobility) all practiced brother-sister marriage. Many people regard these cases as the exceptions that prove the rule. That only families claiming to harbor deities could violate the incest taboo shows not just the strength of such families, but also the strength of the taboo for the rest of society. Nevertheless, this doesn't explain the case of incest in Late-Roman Egypt, where brother-sister marriage was practiced by people of all social classes for at least several centuries. ("Husbands and Wives: Inheritance and Work Brother-Sister Marriage in Roman Egypt" Keith Hopkins, Comparative Studies in Society and History, Vol. 22, No. 3. (Jul., 1980), pp. 303-354.) There goes my plan to justify calling incest obviously irrational (like suicide) based upon universal prohibition.
Thursday, May 01, 2003
Incest and Consent
After reading two editorials in our student paper advocating the legalization of incest (I wonder how Santorum would feel if he knew his remarks were energizing the pro-incest lobby?), one written by my estimable co-blogger, the other by the president of the campus libertarian group, I'm not convinced that allowing a right to privacy requires allowing every bedroom activity, sexual or otherwise, that doesn't hurt others.
It seems to me that we might wish to hold that there are certain activities that, while hurtful only to one's self, are so obviously hurtful that to consent to them is to show that one is incapable of rational consent. There are certainly people (children, the insane) that we agree are incapable of giving rational consent to an action. If it is true that, not having access to an individual's thoughts, we can only judge their ability to reason rationally by the rationality of their actions, then it seems that we would be justified in agreeing that certain actions are in and of themselves sufficient evidence of mental incompetence. I admit I know next to nothing about suicide law, but it seems that this reasoning would be most applicable there. At the least, though, this sort of logic might provide intellectually honest grounds for regulating incest while not regulating sodomy, though of course we would have to explain what makes suicide or incest so obviously harmful to self that no one could rationally choose them.
Obviously, if we were to follow such reasoning, we would have to set a truly high standard as to what constitutes evidence of incapacitation, and it would also seem that, since the individual was incapable of consent, they should not be jailed for their actions. That said, I think there's something extremely disturbing about giving the government the power to decide not just what is legal or illegal, but what is rational or irrational. But if it already does this at a certain level, why not extend the logic to incest? Perhaps someone with more knowledge of the laws regarding suicide or the determination of mental competence can weigh in on this one.
After reading two editorials in our student paper advocating the legalization of incest (I wonder how Santorum would feel if he knew his remarks were energizing the pro-incest lobby?), one written by my estimable co-blogger, the other by the president of the campus libertarian group, I'm not convinced that allowing a right to privacy requires allowing every bedroom activity, sexual or otherwise, that doesn't hurt others.
It seems to me that we might wish to hold that there are certain activities that, while hurtful only to one's self, are so obviously hurtful that to consent to them is to show that one is incapable of rational consent. There are certainly people (children, the insane) that we agree are incapable of giving rational consent to an action. If it is true that, not having access to an individual's thoughts, we can only judge their ability to reason rationally by the rationality of their actions, then it seems that we would be justified in agreeing that certain actions are in and of themselves sufficient evidence of mental incompetence. I admit I know next to nothing about suicide law, but it seems that this reasoning would be most applicable there. At the least, though, this sort of logic might provide intellectually honest grounds for regulating incest while not regulating sodomy, though of course we would have to explain what makes suicide or incest so obviously harmful to self that no one could rationally choose them.
Obviously, if we were to follow such reasoning, we would have to set a truly high standard as to what constitutes evidence of incapacitation, and it would also seem that, since the individual was incapable of consent, they should not be jailed for their actions. That said, I think there's something extremely disturbing about giving the government the power to decide not just what is legal or illegal, but what is rational or irrational. But if it already does this at a certain level, why not extend the logic to incest? Perhaps someone with more knowledge of the laws regarding suicide or the determination of mental competence can weigh in on this one.
